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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK S. NAYLOR, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
RACHEL H. JOLLEY, HUGH E. JOL-
LEY and WILLIAM S. JOLLEY, E:x-
ecutors of the Last vVill and Testament 
of RE.UBEN G. JOLLEY, Deceased; 
FRANC E. S MARION JO,LLIDY, 
HENRY C. JOL.LEY, LILA JOLLEY 
MUELSTEIN, LEO V. JOLLE.Y, 
PEARL JOLLEY DANIELS, HUGH 
K. JOLLEY and WILLIAM S. JOL-
LEY, 
R esp'Ondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NO. 6232 
This is an appeal from the District Court for Utah 
County. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The complaint alleges the execution and delivery by 
defendants and respondents to plaintiff of a contract for 
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the .sale of the land described, consisting of about 500 
acres of land located in Utah County. The contract is 
attached to the complaint as an exhibit. It is specifically 
alleged that at the time of the execution of the agreement 
the sellers were not the owners of the land which they 
had contracted to sell. The contract contained the follow-
ing provision: 
''First parties agree to furnish, at their own ex-
pense, and deliver same to second party on or be-
fore October first 1930, an Abstract of title to said 
property continued to date, and showing the fee and 
unencumbered, marketable title thereto in .said first 
parties, and said second party shall be entitled to 
30 days after same is furnished in which to examine 
and accept the title thereto.'' 
and it provided for the payment upon execution of the 
contract the sum of $2000.00, receipt of which is acknowl-
edged, and $6000.00 in installments of $1000.00 begin-
ning November 30th 1931 and $1000.00 a year thereafter 
until the contract would be paid in full. Plaintiff paid, 
it is alleged, $2561.33 in payments at irregular intervals 
and in amounts differing from that provided for in the 
contract. Subsequently the parties made another agree-
ment, supplementing the fir.st, by the terms of which the 
sellers were relieved of the obligation to make good the 
title to a portion of the lands comprising 93.87 acres, 
p.rovided title to the balance of the land was cleared with 
deeds from the estate of one George G. Kelly. This con-
tract was dated January 28, 1932 and appears on Page 
26 of the abstract. This agreement was made necessary 
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by the fact that the estate of George G. Kelly owned an 
undivided one fifth interest in the land and hence until 
there was a division the entire tract was. involved with 
the Kelly estate. The sellers were, from the very be-
ginning, in default in that they failed to furnish an ab-
stract as provided by the contract, and were, during· all 
of the time, in default because they could not show title. 
The memorandum agreement provided a way out for the 
sellers, had they followed it up by exchanging deeds with 
the Kelly estate, but they failed to do so and in October, 
1933, Reuben G. Jolley died and the property passed to 
his administrator for the purpose of administration. 
While the sellers were thus in default, beginning March, 
1937, they started serving notices of res.cission and for-
feiture by which they specified defaults in payment on 
the part of the buyer; demanded payment and upon 
failure to comply there was a declaration that the con-
tract was terminated. (Abs. 30.) 
In June of 1937 the appellant, having an op:portunity 
to sell the property if he could procure title, employed 
J. W. Stringfellow, a lawyer of Salt Lake City, to assist 
him in his efforts to procure title to the property and 
together with Mr. Stringfellow, he went to Provo to ex-
amine the records, procure title if possible and in con-
nection therewith to consummate the sale of the property 
for a sum largely in exee.ss of the amount he owed. He 
was told that M. R. Straw of the firm of Christensen, 
Straw and Christensen, was handling the Jolley Estate 
matter and he would have to see him. Mr. Stringfellow 
testified with respect to the conference as follows: 
.3 
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"A. 'Mr. Straw said that he would call up Mr. 
Jolley with respect to letting us have the abstract. 
He did. And he said to the party on the other end, 
''Mr. Naylor and Judge Stringfellow are here. They 
.say they have a purchaser for the ranch, but it is 
necessary for them to have the abstract." After a 
pause, I should say two or three minutes., he follow-
e·d ~p, ''Well, they say it is a bona fide purchaser, 
and surely no one will buy the property without 
an opportunity to look at the abstract and to ex-
amine its title, and we ought to let them have it." 
After a paus.e of another few minutes, he hung up 
and he said that Mr. Jolley said that Mr. Naylor 
could not have the abstract but that Stringfellow 
could. But I was to return it after a period of time, 
and I would be held responsible for its return. I 
do not recall as to the length of time that we were to 
have it. And he said that he would bring the ab-
stract down that afternoon. That it was now in 
the safety deposit box and that he couldn't get at 
it. He said he preferred to have the abstract brought 
to date here because he knew an abstracter who had 
done a lot of work for him and he could get some 
concession on the price. That he would give it to 
the abstracter, find the bill-we had previously 
agreed if they would do that we would pay the cost 
of bringing it to date. That he would send us the 
bill. We were to send him the money, and then he 
would s.end us the abstract.' 
Q. After that conversation did you hear any 
further from Mr. Straw other than the letter? 
A. Nothing more than the letter which he sent 
the next day excusing himself from sending the ab-
stract. 
Q.. Is that all your connection with the letter? 
A. That IS my whole connection with the 
matter.'' 
'' .,, 
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The letter referred to in the conversation is as. fol-
lows: 
J. W. Stringfellow, 
310 Utah Oil Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Sir: 
''June 4, 1937 
In the matter of Jolley, et-al vs. Naylor, Mrs. 
Jolley is a p·arty of interest u·nder the contract and 
as the situation res.olves itself, I find myself unable 
to secure the Abstract for delivery to you or to the 
abstractor. If Naylor is a bona fide purchaser, it is 
possible that the Abstract may be examined here for 
the purpose of determining what the title is in re-
spect to the lands under contract, but under the cir-
cumstances, I am not able to control the situation 
nor s.pecifically state what Naylor may be able to 
exp·ect in the nature of cooperation under the facts 
in the case. If it is possible for Naylor to make the 
deal contemplated, or any deal with respect to the 
cleanup· of the matter, I shall do all that I person-
ally can to facilitate such action. 
Regretting ~y inability to comply. with the re-
quest made, I am, 
Very truly yours, 
Christensen, Straw & 
Christensen. 
MRS:HO'' By Straw. 
On July 14th the sellers executed and delivered to the 
executors of George G. Kelly, a deed to 93.87 acres of 
land covered by the Naylor contract and on July 23, 1937, 
executors of the Kelly Estate executed and delivered to 
the executors of the Jolley Estate, a deed to the balance 
of the property. Until that time title to the property 
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s:old was not in· the Jolley Estate and after that, 93.87 
acre.s, of land was wholly withdrawn from the contract, 
with competent·evidence of these facts before the court, 
upon motion of the defendants, the court made and en-
tered its judgment of nonsuit to· which exception wa~ 
taken. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
The appellant assigned as error: 
1. The entry of the judgment of nonsuit for the rea-
son that the sellers were not the owners of the land .solei 
at the· time they made the contract and that they failed 
and refused at all times to furnish an abstract of title 
and that it was not therefore competent for them to 
rescind the contract while thus in default. 
2. That the court erred in holding that the sellers 
could and did terminate the contract while in default in 
not owning the property and in failing to furnish an 
abstract of title, and further, that the appellant was not 
entitled to an abstract showing a clear title and to use 
the contract for the purpose of financing the purchase 
of the property, and generally, that the court erred in 
making and entering judgment of nonsuit. (Abstract 
53.) 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
From the foregoing hrief statement. the court will 
observe that the parties by their contract made the 
marketable title to the real estate with an abstract an 
essential provision of the contract. 
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To avoid confusion we point out at the very beginning 
the fact that an abstract which was furnished to a small 
part of the property was not and is not the abstract which 
the sellers undertook to deliver showing clear title to 
the larger tract of land. An abstract was exhibited after 
title to a small part of the land was cleared up but as 
observed by the letter from M. R. Straw to J. W. String-
fellow the abstract covering the land one-fifth of which 
was owned by the Kelly Estate was not furnished.and as 
late as June 4, 1937, the sellers refused to furnish it. 
We repeat here for the purpose of clarity that the seller 
could not furnish an abstract showing clear title to this 
property even after the contract. under which Naylor 
released Jolley from conveying 93.87 acres was made. 
An abstract would not have cleared up· the controversy 
because the Kelly E.state had an undivided one-fifth in-
terest in the entire tract and although the estate relin-
quished its claim in consideration of the 93.87 acres that 
was not done until long after the seller served notice of 
the rescission of the contract. 
For the equitable consideration of the court we point 
to the further fact that apparently Naylor was so anxious 
to get the prop·erty where he could handle it after he had 
paid $4561.33 on the purchase price of $8000.00 that he 
signed the contract waiving the conveyance of the 93.87 
acres without any .stated consideration. In equity he was 
entitled to have the purchase price reduced proportion-
atel.y. That equity, however, by the seller was com-
pletely ignored. As shown by the testimony, Naylor 
built one mile of wire fence at the alleged expense of 
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$441.00, erected a livestock barn at the expense of 
$1500.00, improved the dwelling house at an expense of 
$150.00, cleared brush from land and put it to intensive 
cultivation at an expense of $500.00, and made other im-
provements by way of preparing the land for seeding and 
cropping at, an expense of $1000.00. The seller, then 
while in default in not furnishing the abstract and pro-
curing the title and in not giving possession to the en-
tire tract ruthlessly and forcefully took possession of the 
property. The repudiation of the contract with the seller 
had gone so far that Naylor could do nothing but accept 
the rescission and sue for damages. The facts as thus 
stated are disclosed by the pleadings and by the testi-
mony. It is true that an old building on the premises 
burned down' and Naylor collected some insurance which 
he used in the erection of the new barn and it is true also 
that he was so far wrecked financially by the contract, 
that he was unable to pay for some of the material that 
went into the barn but that is all beside the question now 
before the court. The defendants offered no testimony 
and the court made judgment of non-suit upon the un-
contradicted evidence of the plaintiff and J. vV. String-
fellow. In doing so the court must have concluded that 
the provision of the contract with respect to the title of 
the land and an abstract showing clear title were uniln-
portant provisions which the sellers were at liberty to 
disregard, or that the sellers while not only in default in 
the performance of that part of their engag_ement, but 
after they had exp,ressly repudiated the obligation to 
furnish an abstract showing clear title could lawfully 
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rescind the contract and forfeit all payments made in 
money and all improvements to the property. The cou·rt 
was wrong on both of these propositions. It goes with-
out saying that the parties by their contract could make 
the delivery of an abstract showing clear title an essen-
tial provision of the contract, in fact, there was an im-
plied obligation on the part of the sellers to furnish title 
to the property. If the mere matter of bringing up an 
abstract were all that was involved, equity might look 
with some consideration· upon the attitude of the sellers 
but that was not the trouble. Naylor had an opportunity 
to sell the property and to save himself and perhaps 
make some profit. He employed a reputable attorney to 
assist him to get the title. They went to Provo, offered 
to have the abstract brought up· to date and to pay the 
expense of it, but the sellers would not even pennit him to 
take on that obligation in addition to his contract obliga-
tions. The letter from Straw, attorney for the sellers, 
is a clear repudiation of that essential provision of the 
contract. There was a very good reason why the sellers 
refused to permit an examination of the abstract for as 
learned by Stringfellow upon examination of the records 
in the Recorder's office, the sellers did not have the title 
and if they had furnished an abstract and if it had been 
brought to date, it would have disclosed the fact that the 
Kelly Estate owned an undivided one-fifth of the larger 
tract of land. Stringfellow found that and Naylor was 
then compelled to drop his contract of sale although he 
had paid a substantial part of the purchase price of the 
property. It was not until the mutual executors deeds 
,g 
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were given by the Jolley Estate to the Kelly Estate and 
the Kelly Estate to the Jolley E:state on July 14, and July 
23, 1937, respectively, that the title to the land excepting 
the 93.87 ac.res was free from this objection and it is not 
known even to this date whether there were other serious 
difficulties with the title to the property because Naylor 
has never had the o,pportunity to examine another ab-
stract. 
It thus appears to be elear from the contract that 
Jolley was at all times in default, and while Naylor was 
likewise in default as to the time and amounts of pay-
ments, still he had made payments aggregating more than 
50% of the contract price of the land and the sellers be-
ing thus in default from the very beginning were not 
under the terms of the contract or in law in a position to 
rescind without subjecting themselves to damages for 
the breach of the contract. 
. 
IS: 
The rule as. laid down in 2 Black on Rescission 553, 
"The right to rescind a contract on the ground 
of failure of performance by the other party, delay 
in performance, want or failure of title, insufficient 
or incomplete performance, breach of conditions or 
of warranties, or for other such causes, cannot be 
claimed by a party who is himself in default in the 
performance of anry of the obligations imposed upon 
him by the contract. Where a complainant, seeking 
the rescission of a contract, has not done all that he 
stipulated to do, or ha.s not placed himself in a situa-
tion to be ready to do so, upon compliance of the 
other ,p.a.rty, the court will not interpose in his be-
half. Thus:, a vendor who is in default for failing 
10 
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to furnish a good title may not terminate the rights 
of the purchaser.'' 
The text is supported by the following cases: 
Price vs. Immel, 48 Colorado 163, 109 Pacific 941 ; 
King vs. Ruckman, 24 New Jersey Equity 556. 
In the latter case under a contract not ess.entially 
different from the contract before the court, the court 
said: 
''It is impracticable to execute the contract in this 
particular, except upon the Doctrine of Cy P·res. The 
decree in this feature of it goes upon the theory that 
the stipulation for time for the payment of the resid-
ium of the price after the acquisition of the· title by 
the purchaser was a substantial part of the agree-
ment and it seems to me that this is well founded in 
the merits of the case. After the vendee gets title 
and the possession, he is then in a position to turn 
the land to account in the way of raising money.'' 
''He can either in whole or in p-art sell or mort-
gage it. The compla.inant in this case w~as by force 
of this agreement entitled to this advatntager and I 
entirely assent to the view of the Vice Chancellor 
that he ought not to be deprived of it by the miscon-
duct of the other party.'' 
The sentence which we have italicized is particularly 
ap·plica ble. 
Central Lumber Company vs. Arkansas Valley 
Lumber Company, Kansas, 119 Pacific 321. 
This case involves lumber but the principle is the 
same. The court said : 
11 
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''If the seller 'had been guilty of the first breach 
of the contract and be himself in default which has 
not been waived, he cannot claim the right to rescind 
because payment for delivery .subsequent to his de-
fault had been withheld.'' 
Naylor, as above observed, paid more than 50% of 
the purcha.se price of the property. He had made exten-
sive imp.rovements and that is not denied. For the pur-
pose of this hearing it is not important that the improve-
ments were of a value less than the amounts stated for 
the court below would not go into the value of improve-
ments at all. He was thus in a position, had the title 
been perfected to .sell as he proposed to a purchaser, 
then ready to buy or to mortgage and to pay up the bal-
ance due on the purchase price. But when he attempted 
to do so he was ruthlessly ejected from the premises and 
all of his payments and improvements forfeited by the 
sellers who were at all times in default. That was not 
only inequitable but as a matter of law, it constituted an 
actionable breach of contract. 
Cases may be cited to the effect that the buyer can-
not demand an abstract showing clear title when he is in 
default in his payments, but such cases are not in point 
because in this case the contract provided for the abstract 
and title. 
The judgment of non-suit should be set aside and the 
case tried on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
··············-············· .................................................................... _ ................ ---································· 
.............................................. -........................• _ ......................... _ ................ -·······-···················-····· 
Atto'rneys for Appellant. 
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